Wednesday, July 23, 2014

THE ULTIMATUM THAT MADE THE GREAT WAR A FOREGONE CONCLUSION / Austria-Hungary presents the Kingdom of Serbia with the "Impossible Ultimatum" 100 years ago July 23, 1914

Aleksandra's Note: What follows is the impossible Austro-Hungarian ultimatum presented to the government of the Kingdom of Serbia on July 23, 1914, just over 3 weeks after the June 28th assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Fair historians have assessed this ultimatum as being both unreasonable and, more importantly, clearly intended to set Serbia up to fail to meet the demands, thus giving the green light for the war against the Serbs the Empire had been planning all along.

First is the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum presented in the original form. This is followed by the Serbian translation. The English text of the Ultimatum follows the Serbian text. All dates indicated are according to the current [Gregorian] calendar. The "old calendar" [Julian] date would show as being 13 days earlier.

The Serbs were given 48 hours to comply. The deadline was July 25, 1914 at 6:00 p.m.

British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey was struck by the nature of the ultimatum, stating that he had "never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character."

By all fair accounts, the Serbian response was remarkably compliant. "Point 6" was the one point they could not submit to, and I challenge any self-respecting sovereign nation to comply to the extent that Serbia did. However, it was not good enough for the Empire, thus proving that the ultimatum of July 1914 was ultimately just a pretense.


Aleksandra Rebic


The Original Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum
to the Kingdom of Serbia July 23, 1914.
(Images courtesy of "Srpska Istorija" on Facebook)
Original Austrian text of Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia 1914
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Original Austrian text of Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia 1914
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Original Austrian text of Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia 1914
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Original Austrian text of Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia 1914
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Original Austrian text of Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia 1914
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Serbian Cyrillic translation of the Austrian Ultimatum of 1914
Serbian Cyrillic translation of Austrian Ultimatum
to the Kingdom of Serbia
July 23, 1914 Page 1 of 2
Serbian Cyrillic translation of Austrian Ultimatum
to the Kingdom of Serbia
July 23, 1914 Page 2 of 2
23 July, 1914: The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia
English Translation

Vienna, July 22, 1914

The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berchtold, to the [Austro-Hungarian] Minister at Belgrade, von Giesl:

Your Excellency will present the following note to the Royal [Serbian] Government on the afternoon of Thursday, July 23 [1914]:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister at the Court of Vienna made, in the name of his Government, the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Serbia recognizes that her rights were not affected by the state of affairs created in Bosnia, and states that she will accordingly accommodate herself to the decisions to be reached by the Powers in connection with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Serbia, in accepting the advice of the Great Powers, binds herself to desist from the attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation since October last, and she furthermore binds herself to alter the tendency of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live on the footing of friendly and neighborly relations with the latter in the future."

Now the history of the past few years, and particularly the painful events of the 28th of June [1914], have proved the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia, whose object it is to separate certain portions of its territory from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which came into being under the very eyes of the Serbian Government, subsequently found expression outside of the territory of the Kingdom in acts of terrorism, in a number of attempts at assassination, and in murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activities of the various unions and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unchecked utterances of the press, the glorification of the authors of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; it has tolerated an unhealthy propaganda in its public instruction; and it has tolerated, finally, every manifestation which could betray the people of Serbia into hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This toleration of which the Royal Serbian Government was guilty, was still in evidence at that moment when the events of the twenty-eighth of June exhibited to the whole world the dreadful consequences of such tolerance.

It is clear from the statements and confessions of the criminal authors of the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived at Belgrade, that the murderers received the weapons and the bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the dispatch of the criminals and of their weapons to Bosnia was arranged and effected under the conduct of Serbian frontier authorities.

The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain the attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward those agitations which center at Belgrade and are spread thence into the territories of the Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obligation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of the Monarchy.

In order to attain this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to demand that the Serbian Government give official assurance that it will condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Monarchy territories that belong to it; and that it will obligate itself to suppress with all the means at its command this criminal and terroristic propaganda. In order to give these assurances a character of solemnity, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26 [1914], the following declaration:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, the whole body of the efforts whose ultimate object it is to separate from the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy territories that belong to it, and it most sincerely regrets the dreadful consequences of these criminal transactions.

"The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus have endangered the friendly and neighborly relations, to the cultivation of which the Royal Government had most solemnly pledged itself by its declarations of March 31, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repels every idea and every attempt to interfere in the destinies of the population of whatever portion of Austria-Hungary, regards it as its duty most expressly to call attention of the officers, officials, and the whole population of the kingdom to the fact that for the future it will proceed with the utmost rigor against any persons who shall become guilty of any such activities, activities to prevent and to suppress which, the Government will bend every effort."

This declaration shall be brought to the attention of the Royal army simultaneously by an order of the day from His Majesty the King, and by publication in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself:

1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;

2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;

5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;

6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;

7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;

9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;

10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points.

The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government by Saturday, the twenty-fifth instant [July 25, 1914], at 6 p.m., at the latest.
A reminder of the results of the investigation about Sarajevo, to the extent they relate to the functionaries named in points 7 and 8 [above], is appended to this note.


The crime investigation undertaken at court in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his comrades on account of the assassination committed on the 28th of June this year, along with the guilt of accomplices, has up until now led to the following conclusions:

1. The plan of murdering Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was concocted in Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a certain Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabesch with the assistance of Major Voija Takosic.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols along with ammunition -- used as tools by the criminals -- were procured and given to Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabesch in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovic and Major Voija Takosic.

3. The bombs are hand grenades originating from the weapons depot of the Serbian army in Kragujevatz.

4. To guarantee the success of the assassination, Ciganovic instructed Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabesch in the use of the grenades and gave lessons on shooting Browning pistols to Princip and Grabesch in a forest next to the shooting range at Topschider.

5. To make possible Princip, Cabrinovic und Grabesch's passage across the Bosnia-Herzegovina border and the smuggling of their weapons, an entire secretive transportation system was organized by Ciganovic. The entry of the criminals and their weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out by the main border officials of Shabatz (Rade Popovic) and Losnitza as well as by the customs agent Budivoj Grbic of Losnitza, with the complicity of several others.

On the occasion of handing over this note, would Your Excellency please also add orally that -- in the event that no unconditionally positive answer of the Royal government might be received in the meantime -- after the course of the 48-hour deadline referred to in this note, as measured from the day and hour of your announcing it, you are commissioned to leave the I. and R. Embassy of Belgrade together with your personnel.

If you would like to get in touch with me, Aleksandra, please feel free to contact me at

Friday, July 18, 2014

Izložba "Srbija i Srbi na filmu u Prvom svetskom ratu" [U galeriji Otvorenog univerziteta u Subotici] / "Tanjug" July 18, 2014

Otvoreni univerzitet u Subotici
July 18, 2014

SUBOTICA - U galeriji Otvorenog univerziteta u Subotici otvorena je izložba "Srbija i Srbi na filmu u Prvom svetskom ratu", kao jedan od predfestivalskih programa festivala evropskog filma Palić koji počinje sutra [19. Jul 2014].
Direktor festivala Radoslav Zelenović rekao je da ovim Jugoslovenska kinoteka i festival daju svoj doprinos obeležavanju stogodišnjice Velikog rata u Srbiji, naglasivši da izložene fotografije predstavljaju isečke iz filmova.
On je dodao da su izvori fotografija materijali koje je filmska sekcija snimila tokom rata, arhive zemalja saveznica, kao i nemački i drugi arhivi koji su bili sa “druge strane u ratu”.
Zelenović je istakao da je izložba interaktivna, jer posetioci mogu mobilnim telefonima ili tabletima da skeniraju fotografije i dobiće na svom uređaju kompletan film iz koga je fotografija isečena.
Direktor Otvorenog univerziteta, organizatora festivala, Blažo Perović rekao je da ovo predstavlja praksu po kojoj se u sklopu samog festivala obeležavaju značajni datumi iz istorije.
Tako će, prema njegovim rečima, šest najznačajnih ostvarenja koja se tiču Prvog svetskog rata biti deo predfestivalske selekcije “Veliki rat na filmu”.
Na 21. Festivalu evropskog filma Palić, koji će se održati od 19. do 25. jula uz podršku Turkiš erlajnsa, biće prikazana 64 filma u okviru šest selekcija. Programi će se prikazivati na više lokacija na Paliću i u Subotici.
If you would like to get in touch with me, Aleksandra, please feel free to contact me at

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

THE PROSPECT OF WAR WITH SERBIA debated in Austrian Ministerial Council Meeting JULY 7, 1914 - "The July Crisis"

Aleksandra's Note: The following documentary evidence, the source of which is the Austrian Ministerial Council during the "JULY CRISIS" of 1914 confirms the "theory" that war with Serbia was a foregone conclusion regardless of  the Austrian "Ultimatum" that would follow on July 23 and regardless of Serbia's response to that Ultimatum. War would be waged against Serbia, period.

What these officials present at this council meeting did not foresee was that war against Serbia would be just the beginning...


Aleksandra Rebic

Franz Ferdinand (in fur-lined coat) on a hunting weekend with Wilhelm II (left) in 1914.
AKG Images

Primary Documents - Austrian Ministerial Council Meeting Minutes, 7 July 1914.

Reproduced below are the official minutes of the Austrian Ministerial Council Meeting which took place on 7 July 1914, some nine days following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914.

During the meeting the prospect of war with Serbia was debated; aside from the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, all present favoured presenting Serbia with a sufficiently severe ultimatum that could not be accepted.  Its rejection would therefore prove grounds for a subsequent declaration of war.

Minutes of Ministerial Council on affairs of State held at Vienna on July 7, 1914, under the presidency of the Minister of the Royal and Imperial Household and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold.

Also present:
The Austrian Premier, Count Sturkh
The Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza
The Joint Minister for Finance, Ritter von Bilinski
The War Minister, Ritter von Krobatin

Keeper of the Minutes: Councillor of Legation, Count Hoyos

Agenda: Bosnian Affairs - The diplomatic action against Serbia

The President opens the sitting by remarking that the Ministerial Council has been called in order to advise on the measures to be used in reforming the evil internal political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as shown up by the disastrous event at Serajevo.

In his opinion there were various internal measures applicable within Bosnia, the use of which seemed to him very appropriate, in order to deal with the critical situation; but first of all they must make up their minds as to whether the moment had not come for reducing Serbia to permanent inoffensiveness by a demonstration of their power.

So decisive a blow could not be dealt without previous diplomatic preparation; consequently he had approached the German Government.  The conversations at Berlin had led to a very satisfactory result, inasmuch as both the Emperor William and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had most emphatically assured its of Germany's unconditional support in the case of hostilities with Serbia.

Meanwhile, we still had to reckon with Italy and with Rumania, and here he agreed with the Berlin Cabinet that it would be better to negotiate and be prepared for any claims to compensation which might arise.  He was clear in his own mind that hostilities with Serbia would entail war with Russia.  Russia, however, was now playing a far-seeing game, and was calculating on a policy of being able to unite the Balkan States, including Rumania, with the eventual objective of launching them at an appropriate moment against the Monarchy.

He suggested that we must reckon on the fact that in face of such a policy our situation was bound steadily to deteriorate, and all the more if an inactive policy of laisser alley were to be interpreted as a sign of weakness by our own South Slavs and Rumanians, and were to be a direct encouragement to the power of attraction of the two neighbour States.

The logical inference to be drawn from his remarks was that we must be beforehand with our enemies and, by bringing matters to a head with Serbia, must call a halt to the gathering momentum of events; later it would no longer be possible to do so.

The Hungarian Premier agreed that during the last few days the results of our investigations and the tone of the Serbian press had put a materially new complexion on events, and emphasized the fact that he himself held the possibility of warlike action against Serbia to be more obvious than he had thought in the period immediately after the act at Serajevo.

But he would never give his consent to a surprise attack on Serbia without previous diplomatic action, as seemed to be contemplated and as had unfortunately already been made the subject of discussion by Count Hoyos at Berlin; were that done, in his opinion, our position in the eyes of Europe would be an extremely bad one, and in all probability we should have to reckon with the enmity of the whole Balkans, except Bulgaria, while Bulgaria herself being at present very much weakened would not be able to give us the necessary support.

It was absolutely necessary that we should formulate demands against Serbia and only send an ultimatum in case Serbia failed to satisfy them.  These demands must undoubtedly be hard, but should not be impossible of fulfilment.  Should Serbia accept them we should be able to quote a dazzling diplomatic victory, and our prestige in the Balkans would be raised.

Should our demands not be accepted he himself would then be for warlike action, but even at this point he thought it essential to lay stress on the fact that the object of such action ought to be the reduction of Serbia, but not her complete annihilation; first, because this would never be allowed by Russia without a life and death struggle, and also because he, as Hungarian Premier, could never consent to the annexation of part of Serbia by the Monarchy.

It was not Germany's place to judge whether we should now deal a blow at Serbia or not.  Personally, he was of opinion that it was not absolutely necessary to go to war at this moment.  At the present time we must take into account that the agitation against us in Rumania was very strong, that in view of the excited state of public opinion, we should have to reckon with a Rumanian attack.

We must also remember that in the sphere of European politics the relation of French to German power would continually deteriorate because of the low birthrate, and that Germany would therefore continually have more troops at her disposal, as time went on, against Russia.

These considerations ought all to be weighed on the occasion of a decision as important as the one to be taken to-day; he must, therefore, come back to this, that, in spite of the crisis of affairs in Bosnia, he would not make up his mind unconditionally for war.

The President remarked that the history of the last years had shown that while diplomatic successes against Serbia raised the reputation of the Monarchy for the time being, the actual tension in our relations with Serbia had only increased.  Neither our success during the annexation crisis, nor at the creation of Albania, nor Serbia's submission later in consequence of our ultimatum of the autumn of last year, had altered the real situation in any way.

He imagined that energetic action alone would suffice to solve once for all the problem created by the systematic propaganda for a Greater Serbia encouraged from Belgrade, the disintegrating effects of which had made themselves felt as far as Agram and Zara.

As regards the danger of a hostile attitude on the part of Rumania, mentioned by the Hungarian Premier, the President remarked that this was less to be feared now than later on, when the unity of interests between Rumania and Serbia would have become more pronounced.

To be sure, King Carol had let fall doubts as to whether he would be able to fulfil his duty as an ally, should occasion arise, by sending active help.  On the other hand, it was scarcely likely that he would allow himself to be so far carried away as to become involved in hostilities against the Monarchy, even supposing that public opinion did not itself oppose that.  Further, there was Rumanian fear of Bulgaria; even as things stood at present this was bound to a certain extent to hamper Rumania's freedom of movement.

As for the observation made by the Hungarian Premier on the relative strength of France and Germany, surely they had to remember that the decreasing birthrate of France was counter-balanced by the infinitely more rapid increase in the population of Russia, so that the argument that in future Germany would always have more troops at her disposal against France would not hold.

The Austrian Premier remarked that to-day's Ministerial Council had actually been called for the purpose of advising about the internal measures to be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to make effective the present inquiry into the assassination, on the one hand, and, on the other, to counteract the Greater Serbia propaganda.  But now these questions must give way to the principal question; should we solve the internal crisis in Bosnia by a demonstration of power against Serbia?

Two considerations now made this principal question an immediate one; first, the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proceeding on the presumption, acquired in the course of inquiries and in consequence of his knowledge of Bosnian affairs, that no internal measures would be effective, unless we made up our minds to deal a forceful blow to Serbia abroad.  In view of this report from General Potiorek we must ask ourselves whether the schismatic activities originating in Serbia could be stopped at all, unless we took action against the Kingdom.

During the last few days the whole situation had received a materially fresh complexion and a psychological situation had been created, which, in his opinion, led unconditionally to an issue of arms with Serbia.

He certainly agreed with the Hungarian Premier that it was for us, and not for the German Government, to decide whether a war were necessary or no; he must nevertheless observe that our decision must be materially influenced by the fact that, in the quarter which we were bound to regard as the greatest support of our policy in 'the Triple Alliance, unconditional loyalty was, as we were informed, promised to us and that, in addition, on our making inquiry, we were urged to act at once; Count Tisza ought to weigh this fact, and to consider that a hesitating, weak policy would run us into the danger of losing the certainty of this unconditional support of the German Empire on a future occasion.

This was the second consideration which must be taken into account in forming our decision, and was additional to our interest in restoring order in Bosnia.

How to begin the conflict was a question of detail, and should the Hungarian Government be of opinion that a surprise attack "sans crier Bare," to use Count Tisza's expression, was not feasible, then they must needs think of some other way; but he did most earnestly hope that, whatever they might do, they would act quickly, and our trade and commerce be spared a long period of unrest.

All this was detail compared with the chief question as to whether it should in any case come to armed action or not, and here the authoritative interest was the reputation and stability of the Monarchy, whose South Slav provinces he held to be lost if nothing were to happen.

They ought, therefore, to make up their minds to-day, in a general way, whether they meant to act or not.  He, too, shared the President's view that the situation would not be in the least improved by a diplomatic success.  If, therefore, international considerations caused them to adopt the method of an initial diplomatic action against Serbia, this would have to be done with the firm intention o f allowing such action to end only in a war.

The Joint Finance Minister observed that Count Sturkh had referred to the fact that the Governor wanted war.  For two years General Potiorek had held the view that we must match ourselves against Serbia, in order to be able to retain Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We ought not to forget that the Governor, who was on the spot, could better judge the situation.  Herr von Bilinski, too, was convinced that a decisive struggle was unavoidable sooner or later.

The Hungarian Premier observed that he had the highest opinion of the present Governor as soldier, but, as regards the civil administration, it could not be denied that it had broken down completely and that reform was absolutely essential.  He would not now enter more fully into this question, especially as it was no time for big alterations; he would only observe that the most incredible conditions must be reigning among the police, to make it possible that six or seven persons known to the police should have been able to place themselves along the route of the procession on the day of the assassination, armed with bombs and revolvers without a single one of them being noticed or removed by the police.  He could not see why the condition of Bosnia could not be materially improved by means of a thorough reform of the administration.

The Joint War Minister is of opinion that a diplomatic success would he of no value.  Such a success would only be interpreted as a weakness.  From the military point of view he must emphasize the fact that it would be better to wage the war now, rather than later, as the balance of power would move disproportionately against us later on.

As for the procedure for beginning war, he might be permitted to remark that the two great wars of recent years, both the Russo-Japanese and the Balkan Wars, had been begun without previous declarations of war.  His opinion was at first only to carry through their contemplated mobilization against Serbia, and let general mobilization wait until they knew whether Russia was going to take action or not.

We had already neglected two opportunities of solving the Serbian question and had deferred decision on both occasions.  If we did this again and took no notice of this latest provocation, this would be taken as a sign of weakness in every South Slav province and we should be inducing an increase of the agitation directed against us.

It would be desirable from a military point of view if the mobilization could be carried out at once, and secretly, and a summons addressed to Serbia only after mobilization had been completed.  This would also be a good thing as against the Russian forces, as just about this time the Russian frontier forces were not at their full strength on account of harvest-leave.

Thereupon a discussion developed about the aims of warlike action against Serbia, and the Hungarian Premier's point of view was accepted, to the effect that Serbia should be reduced in size, but not, in view of Russia, entirely annihilated.

The Austrian Premier emphasized the fact that it might also be advisable to remove the Karageorgevich dynasty and to give the Crown to a European prince, as well as to induce a certain condition of dependency of this reduced kingdom on the Monarchy in relation to military affairs.

The Hungarian Premier still remained convinced that the Monarchy could adopt a successful Balkan policy by means of Bulgaria's adherence to the Triple Alliance, and pointed out what a frightful calamity a European war would be under present circumstances.

The question of war was then further argued thoroughly in the course of a long discussion. At the end of this discussion agreement was reached:

(1) That all present wish for the speediest decision which is practicable in the conflict with Serbia, whether by means of war or peace.

(2) That the Ministerial Council is prepared to adopt the point of view of the Hungarian Premier to the effect that mobilization shall only follow after concrete demands have been addressed to Serbia, and have been refused, and an ultimatum has further been sent.

(3) On the other hand, all present, excepting the Hungarian Premier, hold that a purely diplomatic success, even if ending in a startling humiliation for Serbia, would be without value, and that, therefore, the demands to be put to Serbia must be so far-reaching as to pre-suppose a refusal, so that the way would be prepared for a radical solution by means of military intervention.

Count Tisza observes that he is desirous of meeting the views of all present, and therefore would be prepared to concede this much, that he would agree that the demands to be put to Serbia must be very hard, yet must not be of such a nature as to cause our intention of putting unacceptable demands to become obvious.

Otherwise, our legal position would be an impossible one for a declaration of war.  The text of the Note would have to be most carefully formulated, and he must lay importance on the necessity of seeing the Note before its despatch.  He must further stress the necessity, as regards his own person, of taking the obvious action contingent on having had his point of view rejected.

The meeting was now adjourned till the afternoon.

On the reassembly of the Ministerial Council, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Representative of the Navy Command [Admiral Kailer] were also present.

By request of the President, the Minister for War addressed the meeting and put the following three questions to the Chief of the General Staff [Von Hoetzendorff]:

(1) Whether it would be possible to mobilize against Serbia first, and only subsequently against Russia as well, if this should become necessary?

(2) Whether large bodies of troops could be retained in Transylvania to overawe Rumania?

(3) At which point the war against Russia would be begun?

The Chief of the General Staff, in response to these inquiries, supplies information which is confidential, and therefore requests that it be omitted from the Minutes.

A discussion of some length develops out of these explanations as to the relation of forces and the probable course of a European war, which, on account of its confidential character, could not be entered on the Minutes.

At the end of this discussion the Hungarian Premier repeats his views on the question of war, and once more appeals to all present to weigh their decisions with care.

A discussion followed on the points to be included in the demands to be put in the Note to Serbia.  The Ministerial Council took no definite decision as to these points; suggestions were simply made with a view to obtaining an idea of what demands might be put.

The President sums up to the effect that though there still existed a divergence of view between all members and Count Tisza, yet they had come nearer agreement, inasmuch as the Hungarian Premier's own proposals would in all probability lead up to that armed conflict with Serbia, which he and the others at the meeting held to be necessary.

Count Berchtold informs the meeting that he proposes to travel to Ischl on the 8th, and report to His Imperial Apostolic Majesty.  The Hungarian Premier requests the President to submit also a humble memorial, which he would draw up, on his view of the situation.

After a communiqué had been drawn up for the Press, the President closes the meeting.

Secretary: A. HOYOS (Signature)
BERCHTOLD (Signature)

I have noted the contents of these Minutes. Vienna, August 16th, 1914.

FRANZ JOSEF (Signature)

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. I, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923


If you would like to get in touch with me, Aleksandra, please feel free to contact me at


Monday, July 14, 2014

Ekspedicija „Putevima srpske vojske u Prvom svetskom ratu“ [UPD] (VIDEO) - Organizuje Safari klub pod pokroviteljstvom grada Niša, uz podršku Turističke organizacije Niša / "NTV - Niška Televizija" July 10, 2014

NTV - Niška Televizija
July 10, 2014

Ekspedicija „Putevima srpske vojske od 1914. do 1918. godine“ realizuje se u sklopu Programa obeležavanja stogodišnjice Prvog svetskog rata. Ovaj projekat organizuje Safari klub pod pokroviteljstvom grada Niša, uz podršku Turističke organizacije Niša.

Karavan će krenuti iz Niša 28. jula na stogodišnjicu od početka Prvog svetskog rata I za petnaest dana obići sva stratišta kojima je prošla slavna srpska armija.

Grad Niš imao je vrlo važnu ulogu tokom Prvog svetskog rata. Godine 1914. i 1915. bio je ratna prestonica, u kojoj su donete sudbonosne odluke za srpski i ostale južnoslovenske narode. Ekspedicija Putevima srpske vojske u Prvom svetskom ratu, čiji je pokrovitrelj Grad Niš, jedna je od manifestacija u okviru programa obeležavanja velikog jubileja.

Turistička organizacija Niša suorganizator je ekspedicije „Putevima srpske vojske od 1914. do 1918″. U saradnji sa drugim turistickim organizacijama u Srbiji, pomoći će realizaciju ovog projekta.

Karavan od pet terenskih vozila u kojima će se nalaziti 10 do 12 ljudi na trasi od 3500 kilometara preći će put kojim se kretala glavnina srpske vojske i pritom prikupljanti i dokumentovati nove podatke i činjenice o dramatičnim i slavnim danima srpske istorije.

Obimna video i foto-dokumentacija prikupljena sa ekspedicije, biće pretočena u desetak reportaža i dokumentarni film, koji će biti prezentovan javnosti septembra ove godine.

VIDEO published on You Tube by "NiskaTelevizija"
Published on Jul 10, 2014


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[VIDEO] U Nišu će 28. jula [2014] biti obeležena godišnjica početka Prvog svetskog rata - ”Putevima srpske vojske u Prvom svetskom ratu” / "Belle Amie" July 8, 2014

Belle Amie
July 8, 2014

U Nišu će 28. jula biti obeležena godišnjica početka Prvog svetskog rata.

Tog dana će iz Niša krenuti Auto safari, pod nazivom ”Putevima srpske vojske u Prvom svetskom ratu”.

Istog dana će na Letnjoj pozornici biti izvedena predstava ”1915, tragedija jednog naroda”, a biće otkrivena i spomen ploča na zgradi Univerziteta, gde je 1914. stigao telegram o objavi rata.

Video posted on You Tube by "Belle amie"
Published on Jul 8, 2014
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Saturday, July 12, 2014

MUZEJ MLADE BOSNE - Memorija na Mladobosance u Beogradu / Branko Bojović June 23, 2014

"Mlada Bosna" 1912

Knjiga Vladimira Dedijera „Sarajevo 1914“ objavljena je 1966. godine (Prosveta) i možda je najznačajnije delo domaće istorijografije o Mladoj Bosni.  Izuzetna vrednost Dedijerove knjige je u tome što je autor detaljno osvetlio kratke sekvence života Mladobosanaca koje su oni živeli u Beogradu, kao naši sugrađani, i precezno identifikovao mesta gde su oni provodili beogradsko vreme svojih života. Navodim samo neke podatke iz Dedijerove knjige:

* U parkiću na Topličnom vencu gde se danas nalazi spomenik Vojinu Popoviću – Vojvodi Vuku, Princip i Čabrinović su jedan drugom dali reč da će izvršiti atentat na Franca Ferndinanda,

* Mladobosanci su se okupljali u Savamali, u kafani koja se tada zvala „Zlatna moruna“ i koja se posle kraće pauze ponovo tako zove,

* Prve dve sednice tajne organizacije „Smrt ili život“ održane su na mestu gde je ubijen Knez Mihaila, u Košutnjaku,

* Principa i Grabeža u pucanju iz revolvera, po nalogu Voje Tankosića, obučavao je Ciganović na strelištu  u Topčideru,

* Gavrilo Princip je stanovao u Lominoj ulici br. 47, najpre sa Tripkom Grabežom, a posle sa Vladetom Bilbijom, ta kuća više ne postoji,

* Čabrinović i Princip su se zakleli organizaciji „Smrt ili život“ u podrumu jedne od zgrada u Ulici Kraljice Natalije gde je i kafana „Zlatna moruna“.

* Itd., itd.
Ove činjenice su veoma važne za obeležavanje memorije na Mladobosance u Beogradu po principu autentičnog mesta. U ovom kratkom tekstu iznosim nekoliko osnovnih ideja o tome.
U Beogradu i danas postoji objekat u kome se nalazila i nalazi kafana „Zlatna moruna“, a posle kratke pauze u kojoj je taj objekat menjao ime i namenu „Zlatna moruna“ postoji i danas. Zbog činjenice da su se Mladobosanca okupljali u toj kafani, taj objekat je svrstan u znamenite zgrade, odnosno postao je spomenik kulture. Po istorijskim događaijama koji su vezani za ovaj objekat sasvim je izvesno da je ovo jedna od najznačajnih zgrada za istoriju Srba, Srbije i Beograda.
Prvi značajni urbanistički potez u rekonstrukciji i izgradnji srpskog Beograda, bilo je planiranje i izgradnja tzv. Abadžijske čaršije, koju je Knez Miloš izgradio negde oko 1830. godine, tj. u vreme donošenja Hatišerifa.  U ovu čaršiju trebalo je izmestiti pripadnike abadžijskog zanata. Jedinstvenost tog urbanističkog poduhvata bilo je i to što su duž čaršije bile građene tipske zgrade u drvenom skeletu sa raznim vrstama ispuna. Do našeg vremena su se sačuvale kuće sa brojevima 8, 10 i 12. One su srušene 80-tih godina iz nedovoljno jasnih razloga. U podrumu nekih od tih kuća, možta baš neke od ove tri, Čabrinović i Princip su se zakleli jedan drugom da će izvršiti atentat. Te kuće su bile spomenici urbane kulture i arhitekture  ranog 19. veka, a zakletva dvojice Mladobosanaca te kuće čini i prvorazrednim istorijskim spomenikom. Te tri kuće u nizu treba obnoviti na istom mestu gde su nekada postojale jer o njima postoji tehnička i fotografska dokumentacija.
U postojeći objekat „Zlatne morune“ i tri obnovljene kuće nekadašnje Abadžijske čaršije treba smestiti Muzej Mlade Bosne. Deo zelene površine preko puta ovih objekata (neparna strana Ulice kraljice Natalije) treba da bude park Mlade Bosne gde bi trebalo postaviti spomenike istaknutih članova Mlade Bosne.
Na svim mestima gde su svoje kratke živote živeli Mladobosanci trebalo bi postaviti spomen obeležja – nova kuća u Lominoj 47, strelište u Topčideru, parkić kod somenika Vojvode Vuka i dr.
Malom srpskom narodu u borbi za opstanak i slobodu pripalo je to da u istoriji ovog dela Evrope ima učešće koje daleko prevazilazi njegove biološke i druge kapacitete. Bitan deo savremene istorije srpskog naroda povezan je sa Mladobosancima koji u Beogradu i Srbiji nisu odgovarajući obeleženi.  Formiranjem muzeja Mlade Bosne, srpski narod bi odužio dug patriotima i i idealistima koji su slobodu cenili više od sopstvenih života.
U muzeju bi trebalo predstaviti organizaciju Mlade Bosne i sve značajne i delatne članove te organizaciju, njene veze sa drugim organizacijama, kao što je Crna ruka  (Ujedinjenje ili smrt) i sve značajne ličnosti direktno ili indirektno povezane sa te dve organizacije – Mustafu – Mujku Golubića, Đuru Šarca, ali i čestitog advokata Rudolfa Cistlera koji je za Principa i drugove bio ono što je Arčibal Rajs bio za Srbiju, koju godinu kasnije. U muzeju bi trebalo predstaviti i beščašće savremene evropske i američke istoriografije koji na grubim falisifikatima istorije grade tzv. reviziju istorijskih stavova o uzrocima Prvog svetskog rata.
Današnje vreme mnogi porede sa vremenom pred  Veliki rat. Vremena se menjaju, ali se ludilo imperijalnih sila ne menja – ono samo menja način ispoljavanja. Srbija ne može preglasati imperije koje neprekidno ratuju od kraja Drugog svetskog rata i koje decenijama terorišu male narode i države.  Ne može da spreči da teroristi i istoričari u njihovoj službi Gavrila Principa proglašavaju za teroristu, a srpski narod za sklonost terorizmu.  Srpski narod svemu tome može najbolje  da odgovori negujući nacionalnu i slobodarsku svest i čuvajući svoju istinu o svojoj istoriji.  Muzej Mlade Bosne bio bi pravi korak u tom pravcu.
Branko Bojović, dipl.inž.arh.
U Beogradu, 23.06.2014.


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